State of Utah v. J. Herbert Hansen and Gertrude T. Hansen : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
State of Utah v. J. Herbert Hansen and Gertrude T.
Hansen : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Appellants;
Robert S. Campbell and Arthur A. Allen; Attorney for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Hansen, No. 9679 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4060
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE c - , i F 0 
STATE OF UTAH,,~:. , ~~~= 
~ ,_, -~ 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ·c;.)i ·: s~~-.~~-m~ c~~;-:·. IJ:·u:-' 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. HERBERT HANSEN and GER-
TRUDE T. HANSEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
9679 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Hon. Merrill C. Faux, Judge 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
State Capitol Building, 
RONALD C. BARKER, 
2870 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -------------------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT __________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------- 10 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE RELA-
TIVE TO COSTS OF REMOVAL AND DAMAGE 
TO PERSONAL PROPERTY SITUATED ON 
THE CONDEMNED PARCEL AT THE DATE 
OF CONDEMNATION -------------------------------------------- 10 
(a) Costs and damage incident to the removal 
and relocation of personal property is not a com-
pensable element in an eminent domain proceed-
tng __ __ _ ___________ _ ______ _ ____ _ __________ __________________ ___ _ ________ _______ _ __ _ 10 
(b) Such costs and damage constitute an indi-
rect claim against the State of Utah ------------------------ 16 
POINT II. APPELLANTS FAILED TO TAKE EX-
CEPTION TO INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT 
NOS. 15 AND 16 -------------------------------------------------------- 18 
(a) The landowners are, therefore, barred from 
raising objections to those instructions at the ap-
pellate level ____________ ------------------------------ ________________ ________ 18 
POINT III. INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT, NOS. 
13 AND 14 PROPERTY SUBMITTED THE IS-
SUES OF ACCESS-CONTROL TO THE JURY____ 20 
(a) A property owner, whose tract abuts upon 
a public highway facility, has only the right of 
reasonable ingress and egress under the circum-
stances ____________ ------- ___ ----- _- ---------------------------_ _ __ ____ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ 2 0 
(b) The finding of the jury (that remaining 
access was reasonable under the circumstances) 
tvas supported by the great tveight of testimony____ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
CON CL USI ON -------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 
CASES CITED 
Arizona State Highway Department v. Chun, et al., 
91 Ariz. 317, 372 P. 2d 324 ( 1962) ------------------------ 11 
Ballantyne Company v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 
113 N. W. 2d 486 ( 1962) ------------------------------------------ 16 
Basinger v. Standard Furniture Co., 118 Utah 121, 
220 P. 2d 117 ( 1950) ------------------------------------------------ 24 
Fairclough v. State Road Commission, 10 U. 2d 417, 
354 p. 2d 105 ( 1960) ------------------------------------------------ 17 
Hague v. Juab County Mill and Elevator Company, 357 
Utah 290, 107 Pac. 249 ( 1910) -------------------------------- 23 
In Re Assessment for Widening Third Street in St. 
Paul, 176 Minn. 389, 223 N. W. 458 ------------------------ 12 
Korengold v. City of Minneapolis, 95 N. W. 2d 112, 
Minn. ( 1959) -------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
LaMesa v. Tweed and Babrell Planning l\iill, 304 P. 
2d 803 (Cal. 1956) ------------------------------------------------------ 12 
Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio 416, 149 N. E. 2d 238 ( 1958) 16 
Marks v. Tompkins, 7 Utah 421, 27 Pac. 6 -------------------- 19 
McCall v. Kendrick, 2 U. 2d 364, 274 P. 2d 962 (1954) 20 
McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468 ____ 27 
People of California v. Auman, et al., 220 P. 2d 569 
(Cal. 1950) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 
505 ( 1942) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
St. Louis City v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 266 Mo. 694, 182 
s. ~- ~f)(} -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1~ 
Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 2~9 P. 2d 
1~4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2~ 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 18fi Kan. 44fi, 
346 p. 2d 2fi9 ( 19fi9) ------------------------------------------------ 2fi 
Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 1(} U. 2d 306, 
3fi2 P. 2d 693 ( 1960) ------------------------------------------------ 11 
Springville Banking Company v. Burton, et al., 1(} U. 
2d 1(}(}, 349 p. 2d 1fi~ ( 196(}) ---------------------------------- 22 
State v. Anderson, ~f) Utah 496, 286 Pac. 64fi ________________ 19 
State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, ~(}~ P. 2d 88~ ( 19fi7) ________ 19 
State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 25 
State of California v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 3fi2 P. 2d 
fi19 ( 195(}) ------------------------------------------------------------------ 22 
State of Oregon v. Ralston, 359 P. 2d 529 (Ore. 1961) __ 21 
State Road Commission v. Rozzelle, et ux., 1(}1 Utah 
464, 120 p. 2d 276 ( 1941) ---------------------·------------------ 21 
State of New York v. Bodner Industries, 187 N. Y. S. 
2d 359 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
State of Utah v. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 
p. 2d 502 ( 193~) -------------------------------------------------------- 15 
State of Utah v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 3(}fi P. 2d 495 
( 195 ~) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
State of Utah v. Sine, 13 U. 2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585 
( 1962) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
State v. Zimmerman, 78 Utah 126, 1 P. 2d 962 ____________ 19 
U. S. v. Petty Motor Company, 327 U. S. 372, 66 S. 
Ct. fi96, 90 L. Ed. 729 ( 1946) -------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Walker v. State of Washington, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 
p. 2d 328 ( 1956) -------------------------------------------------------- 22 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 
12 U. 2d 64, 362 P. 2d 580 ( 1961) -------------------------- 21 
Winn v. United States, 272 F. 2d 282 (9th Cir. 1959) __ 21 
Wood v. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d 516 (1962) ____ 17 
AUTHORITIES 
78-34-10 (1), (2) and (3), U. C. A. (1953) __________________ 13 
78-34-1, et seq., U. C. A. ( 1953) -------------------------------------- 15 
Title 27, Chapter 9, Section 1, U. C. A. (1953) ______________ 24 
29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, Sec. 162 ---------------------------- 16 
Article 1, Section 22, Utah Constitution ______________________ 15, 16 
Article VII, Section 13, Utah Constitution ____________________ 17 
Rule 51, U. R. C. P. ------------------------------------------------------------ 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. HERBERT HANSEN and GER-
TRUDE T. HANSEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9679 
This is an action brought by the respondent under and 
pursuant to the laws of eminent domain, to acquire the 
property of appellants for public highway utilization. Mat-
ters relating to the power of the respondent to condemn, 
public use and necessity of the highway project and the 
acquisition of appellants' properties therefor, and location 
of the facility in a manner consonant with the greatest 
public good and least private injury were admitted by ap-
pellants, and the case was thereupon tried as to the issues 
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of evaluation of the property to be expropriated and com-
pensation to be paid therefor. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux, District Judge, en-
tered the judgment of the court, upon the general verdict 
returned by the jury of eight, against the respondent and 
in favor of the appellants in the sum of $24,900.00, for in-
terest and costs incurred. 
From that judgment the appellants have lodged their 
appeal with this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement appearing in appellants' brief on the 
facts raised at the trial is in most respects incomplete and 
to some extent, inaccurate. In order to place the entire 
case in its proper spectrum, respondent deems it advisable 
to recount the testimony and evidence adduced by the par-
ties, respectively, as such affected the issues before the 
lo,ver Court. 
On the 19th day of September, 1960, the State of Utah, 
acting through its Road Commission, filed a complaint in 
the District Court for Salt Lake County to acquire, by emi-
nent domain, property of the appellants, comprising 1.815 
acre of land, said tract being more particularly described 
in the Second Amended Condemnation Resolution as Parcel 
No. 018-1 :9 :A (R. 1-4) (R. 86). Occupancy of the property, 
pendante lite, was thereafter assumed by the respondent 
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and the public work was carried forward (R. 6, 7). The 
property of appellant, situate in an industrial area of Salt 
Lake County (Tr. 306), abutted upon the north side of 
21st South Street between 6th West Street and 7th West 
Street (See State's Ex. 1). 
A reduced print of Exhibit 1 is attached to and made 
a part of this brief for illustrative purposes: the primary 
portion of the print is representative of the landowners' 
property by red coloring, improvements outlined in black 
thereon, the public right-of-way evidenced in brown shad-
ing, and the system of public streets, as utilized prior to 
the taking, is outlined in black. 
The area expropriated by the State of Utah is set forth 
on the plastic overlay of the print in green color and the 
construction of the highway project, is graphically illus-
trated on the overlay as such relates to appellants' remain-
ing property. The total tract of appellants prior to con-
demnation encompassed 18.06 acres, more or less, of which 
0.026 acre was devoted to the existing highway along 21st 
South Street. The property of appellants, at the date of 
service of summons, served a wrecking and scrap metal 
yard and business was conducted under the style name of 
Sandy Metal Works (Tr. 39, 40, 66). 
Prior to the filing of the complaint, 21st South Street 
supported east-west traffic, one 12 foot lane in each direc-
tion (Tr. 21, L. 20), the access at all points throughout the 
facility being uncontrolled; nor was there installed any 
traffic control devices, median strips, channel regulators, 
or electronic signals in front of appellants' property. Sixth 
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West Street, prior to the taking, did not intersect directly 
with 21st South Street (Tr. 20, 21, 22); rather, traffic pro-
ceeding south on 6th West reached the traveled segment 
of 21st South by following a service road which commenced 
at a point approximating the southeast corner of appellants' 
tract and ran thence westerly 365 feet, more or less, where 
the intersection with 21st South was consummated (see 
base print of attached exhibit). 
21st South Street, as originally designed, was con-
structed to accommodate a traffic flow of 4,000 vehicles 
per day, 2,000 traffic units in each direction (Tr. 256, L. 2). 
At or about the date that the State of Utah filed its com-
plaint, the facility, during a 14 hour period, 'vas handling 
in excess of 16,000 motor vehicles (Tr. 251). Although 
the highway authority had not regulated the access from 
appellants' property to 21st South Street, the service road, 
or 6th West Street prior to September, 1960 (see Stipula-
tion Tr. 31, 32), the landowners had constructed a seven 
foot chain link fence around the southern periphery of the 
parcel, ingress and egress being provided by a 16 foot open-
Ing on 21st South Street. Said point of access was approxi-
mately 300 feet from the southwest corner of the parcel as 
shown on the base exhibit (Tr. 27, 28). 
The construction of the public improvement called for 
the following: 
a. Creation of a six-lane divided highway (3 lanes I 
in each direction) each avenue approximating 12 I 
feet in width (Tr. 124); · 
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b. Establishment of a raised-concrete median strip 
( 16 feet in width) separating east-bound and west-
bound traffic arteries (Tr. 25, 249); 
c. Projection of left-turn stall lanes (accommodat-
ing twelve vehicles) for traffic from both easterly 
and westerly directions on 21st South Street at the 
"plus" intersection formed by the service road and 
Roper Lane (Tr. 249) (see overlay); 
d. Reconstruction of the service road on property 
to be acquired in the eminent domain proceeding 
(see overlay, attached exhibit); 
e. Construction of highway shoulders on each side 
of 21st South Street eight feet wide (Tr. 25, 117); 
f. Establishment of controlled-access lines, regu-
lating ingress and egress from appellants' remain-
ing tract to the 21st South facility, said limited ac-
cess feature commencing at the southwest corner 
of the remaining property and continuing in an 
easterly direction 308.6 feet (see Stipulation, Tr. 
31, 32, 33). The frontage included within the con-
trolled-access line is delineated on the plastic over-
lay; 
g. The maintenance of a right-of-way line along 
the balance of appellants' frontage on 21st South 
Street and the service road (the distance thereof 
being 575 feet, more or less) with access provided 
to the landowners at any point desired along said 
right-of-way line (see overlay, attached exhibit). 
Appellants, by offer of proof endeavored to show that 
at the date of condemnation, a number of wrecked automo-
biles were located on the property acquired by the State 
of Utah; that the cost of removing the said vehicles and 
vehicle parts from the condemned area, together with the 
loss in value of the personal property, was $16,500.00 (Tr. 
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212, 213, 214 and 215). The proffer was denied by the 
court (Tr. 215), the reasons therefor being announced (Tr. 
7), and the trial proceeded on the questions of evaluation 
of the tract expropriated and the damage, less benefits, to 
the severed land remaining. 
As mentioned herein, the State of Utah proposed to 
regulate and control access from a portion of appelants' re-
maining property to the public improvement (Tr. 29). In 
that regard, respondent asserted that such regulation was 
a proper and non-compensable function of the sovereign 
in its exercise of the police power (Tr. 5, 7, 114-117); the 
appellants contended that the controlled-access line con-
stituted an unreasonable regulation in light of existing cir-
cumstances and such limitation on ingress and egress was, 
therefore, compensable (Tr. 115-120). Testimony was 
thereafter introduced on behalf of the State to prove the 
exigencies of the public for the development of a controlled-
access highway on 21st South Street as it passes the prop-
erties of appellants. Mr. Holding, Deputy Highway Engi-
neer of the State Road Commission, testified that the lim-
ited-access measures would be realized on 21st South Street 
from 3rd West Street, on the east, to Redwood Road, on 
the west (Tr. 126, 127, 145); that the viaduct overpassing 
the railroad trackage between 4th West and 6th West re-
quires that traffic approaching appellants' property from 
the east negotiate a downgrade; and that in the witness's 
opinion, congested traffic on 21st South Street required 
some regulation of access to and from abutting properties 
in order to insure minimum standards of highway safety 
(Tr. 145). 
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Dale Burningham, Deputy Chief Research Engineer, 
testified that the public agency had conducted a series of 
studies relative to the need of controlled devices on 21st 
South Street (Tr. 241-249). That the facility was carrying 
in excess of four times its designed capacity (Tr. 251), that 
every intersection involved 16 points of conflict, with each 
additional access opening creating new points of conflict 
which produce increased traffic hazards (Tr. 262). Fur-
ther, the witness stated that upon construction of the in-
terstate highway facility (north-south freeway) at approx-
imately 4th West Street, a cloverleaf interchange would 
be developed to serve 21st South Street traffic and that 
the construction of such thru-way and cloverleaf, in the 
opinion of the Department, would cause an even greater 
influx in average daily traffic on 21st South Street ( Tr. 
254). Testimony, further, was illustrative that the high-
way was designed to facilitate traffic up to speeds of 50 
m.p.h. (Tr. 289) and that the regulation of access, as pro-
posed along appellants' property, would eliminate internal 
stream friction of traffic movement and reduce the hazards 
and danger of accidents (Tr. 274, 280). The landowners 
did not place into evidence any testimony as to the relative 
needs for controlled access on 21st South Street as such 
pertained to public safety and traffic movement. 
Appellants' evaluation witness, Mr. Kiepe, testified 
that the highest and best use of the area taken was dual, 
industrial and commercial (Tr. 103), and that, in his opin-
ion, the value of the land acquired at the date of condem-
nation was $13,000, severance damage $40,700, or a total 
opinion of $53,700. 
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After landowners rested their case In chief, the re-
spondent went forward with the testimony of three evalua-
tion witnesses, Edmund D. Cook, Augustus Johns and C. 
Francis Solomon. All evaluation witnesses for the State of 
Utah testified that the highest and best use of the subject 
property, at the date of condemnation, was industrial utili-
zation (Tr. 306, 334, 360), the tract lying within an M-2 
Industrial Zone of the municipality (Tr. 306). The specific 
evaluation estimates of the witnesses were, respectively, as 
follows: 
a. Cook 
1. Land and improvements taken ----$20,570.00 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property --------------------------- _______________ 100.00 
3. Total opinion ----------------------------------$20,670.00 
b. Johns 
1. Value of land and improvements 
taken ------------------------------------------------$21,157.00 
2. Severance damage to remaining 
property ------------------------------------------ 1,308.00 
3. Total opinion ----------------------------------$22,465.00 
c. Solomon 
1. Value of land and improvements __ $20,650.00 
2. Damage to remaining property ____ 3,400.00 
3. Total opinion ----------------------------------$24,050.00 
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With respect to the reasonableness of controlled-access, 
the Court, in addition to the submission of the general ver-
dict form, propounded the following special interrogatory 
to the jury: 
"We, the jury, find from a preponderance of 
the evidence in this case the following answer to the 
question propounded to us : 
"Is the non-access limitation imposed upon 
the west portion of defendants' land unreason-
able? 
"Answer: " 
The panel of jurors on March 22, 1962, answered the 
above set forth interrogatory in the negative (R. 83). The 
jury, additionally, returned its general verdict in the fol-
lowing amount : 
a. Value of land and improvements 
taken by the State of Utah ----------------$21,500.00 
b. Damages to the property remaining __ 3,400.00 
c. Total verdict ----------------------------------------1$24,900.00 
From the judgment entered upon the verdict, appel-
lants have prosecuted this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE RELA-
TIVE TO COSTS OF REMOVAL AND DAM-
AGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY SITUATED 
ON THE CONDEMNED PARCEL AT THE 
DATE OF CONDEMNATION. 
(a) Costs and damage incident to the removal 
and relocation of personal property is not a com-
pensable element in an eminent domain proceed-
~ng. 
Appellants, by this appeal, seek to overturn the deci-
sion of the lower Court wherein it was declared that costs 
and expenses incurred in removing chattels and other per-
sonal property from the exproporiated tract and the dam-
age incident to such removal are not compensable factors to 
be considered in a condemnation proceeding. Their brief 
in support of this point, at the same time, is void of any 
discussion respecting the established judicial precedent 
advocated by other courts passing on the issue. 
The unquestioned weight of authority in the United 
States supports the proposition of law that removal and 
relocation costs of personalty from the condemned prem-
ises may not be recovered in eminent domain. Graphic of 
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this almost uniform pronouncement is the recent statement 
of the Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona State Highway 
Department v. Chun, et al., 91 Ariz. 317, 372 P. 2d 324 
( 1962) : 
"* * * The view sustained by the great ma-
jority of the cases is that an owner of real property 
taken or damaged in eminent domain is not entitled 
to compensation for the costs of removal of personal 
property from the premises. * * *" 
In adhering to this principle, the courts have suggested a 
variety of reasons for denying payment : 
a. Eminent domain being treated as a sale between 
a willing buyer and seller, the buyer is not expected 
to pay for the removal costs of the seller's personal 
property; 
b. Removal costs and damage are remote, conjec-
tural, and speculative; 
c. The statutes on eminent domain do not recog-
nize such reimbursement. 
As to the first specification, this court has oft-stated 
the basic test utilized in a proceeding to condemn property 
is that price which a willing buyer would pay for the par-
cel, and that price for vvhich a willing seller would sell the 
property, neither being under the obligation to buy or sell, 
and both being reasonably informed as to the market. 
State of Utah v. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957); 
Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 
2d 693 ( 1960). In determining what that price is to be, 
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it is safe to say that in the normal course of events, neither 
buyer nor seller would anticipate paying or receiving the 
expenses that the seller would incur in removing his per-
sonal property from the premises. The rationale of this 
fact was acknowledged by the Minnesota Court in In Re 
Assessment for Widening Third Street in St. Paul, 176 
Minn. 389, 223 N. W. 458: 
"Appellant further claims that it is entitled to 
recover the expense of removing from the building. 
Appellant owns the building and stands in the po-
sition of seller. The city stands in the position of 
a buyer. Their relations are analogous to those be-
tween private parties where one is selling and the 
other buying. Where the owner sells to a private 
party, he removes from the property at his O\Vn 
expense. Where property is condemned the owner 
receives its fair value, and the decided weight of 
authority is that he is not entitled to an additional 
allowance for the expense of removing therefrom." 
The cornerstone of the eminent domain proceeding in-
volves the appraisal of real property placed to the public 
use together with the assessment of damages to severed or 
non-contiguous real property remaining to the condemnee. 
78-34-10 (1), (2) and (3), U. C. A.1953. Historically, as 
well as statutorily, the legitimate objectives of the trial 
are to appraise real property interests, not to a\vard the 
landowner a sum for removing and relocating his chattels. 
In the case of LaM esQ v. T1veed and Bambrell Planning 
Mill, 304 P. 2d 803 (Cal. 1956), recovery for removal and 
relocation of personal property from the condemned area 
was refused, the California Court saying: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"The cost of removing personal property is not 
a compensable item in a condemnation proceeding. 
Central Pac. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 263; 
County of Los Angeles v. Signal Realty Company, 
86 Cal. App. 704, 710, et seq., 261 Pac. 536. * * * 
The cost of removing or relocating such equipment 
is not reasonably related to its value as a part of 
the premises involved. Such a cost is not a com-
pensable item recoverable as a part of the award 
for land taken or on account of severance damage. 
* * * " 
See also People of California v. Auman, et al., 220 P. 2d 
569 (Cal. 1950). 
As to the second specification above mentioned, testi-
mony bearing upon any costs to remove and relocate per-
sonal property, by its inherent nature, is so speculative and 
conjectural that it should not, as a matter of law, be re-
ceived. If such were admissible, the court would have to 
determine what a reasonable cost would be. In some cir-
cumstances, the expense might consist of removing the 
chattels to the contiguous property remaining to the owner; 
by the same mark, the owner could undoubtedly show that 
in order to utilize the property in substantially the same 
manner as before, it would be necessary to relocate it at a 
point more remote and distant. In cases of a total taking, 
the recovery could equal the cost of removing the person-
alty several miles from the right-of-way area, to the next 
county, or even to another state. The obscure and specu-
lative features of this type of damage required the Missouri 
Supreme Court in St. Louis City v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 266 
Mo. 694, 182 S. W. 750, to reject the admission of such 
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evidence on the ground that there was no objective method 
to produce a uniform result. That court held: 
"At first glance it is to be conceded that there 
exists a difficulty in finding a reason for not com-
pensating the owner of personal chattels who is 
compelled to remove them for his expense in so re-
moving them to a point at least beyond the edge 
of the right of way. It is equally clear, on the other 
hand, that no logical reason can be found for com-
pensating him for the expense of removal beyond 
such point. This is so, for the reason A might de-
sire to move his chattels only into the next adjoin-
ing house, while B might desire to have his taken 
several blocks or even several miles, and C on the 
other hand, his business being broken up, might 
desire to remove his goods to some other place or 
city." 
The Missouri court went on to say that the traditional con-
cept of willing buyer and willing seller was the paramount 
consideration and that removal costs were not compensa-
ble: 
"Viewed as a forced purchase by the public for 
the public good, as a damage action is, in the last 
analysis, the latter consideration seems of great 
weight, for if he whose land is condemned had vol-
untarily sold his land to a private purchaser, ordi-
narily, no thought would occur to either court or 
parties, absent agreement to that end, that the seller 
should be compensated by the buyer for the removal 
from the sold premises of mere personal goods and 
chattels." 
The Supreme Court of the United States has n1ade its 
position known on the question. In U. S. v. Petty Motor 
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Motor Company, 327 U. S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 
729 (1946), the Federal Government sought to condemn 
only a leasehold interest. The condemnee alleged that it 
ought to have its costs for removal and relocation of per-
sonal property. Mr. Justice Reed, for the court, stated: 
"We think the sounder rule under the federal 
statutes is to treat the condemnation of all inter-
ests in a leasehold like the condemnation of all in-
terests in the fee. In neither situation should evi-
dence of the cost of removal or relocation be ad-
mitted." 
As to the third specification, the statutes of this juris-
diction, particularly those dealing with eminent domain 
(Title 78, Chapter 34, Section 1, et seq.) are silent on ap-
pellants' claim for compensation. In stereotyped fashion, 
appellants cite the ''damage clause" of Article I, Section 22, 
Utah Constitution, as their standard for recouping reloca-
tion and removal costs. The quick and proper response 
to this argument is that this Court has held that the Article 
I, Section 22 "damage clause" has reference only to that 
injury which was actionable at the common law. State of 
Utah v. Fourth District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 
( 1937). It becomes, therefore, sufficient to say that costs, 
expenses and damage for removal and relocation of per-
sonal property from the condemned premises were not ac-
tionable nor compensable at the common la\v. State of New 
York v. Bodner Industries, 187 N. Y. S. 2d 359 (1959); 
Korengold v. City of Minneapolis, 95 N. W. 2d 112 (Minn. 
1959); 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, Sec. 162. 
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In Ballantyne Company v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 
229, 113 N. W. 2d 486 (1962), the municipal authority 
sought to condemn the interest of lessee. The Constitution 
of Nebraska set forth a similar type of "damage clause" 
as maintained in Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution. 
It was held therein that in absence of specific statute to 
the contrary, compensation cannot be recovered for reloca-
tion and removal costs proximately caused by condemna-
tion. 
A suit was instituted in Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio 
416, 149 N. E. 2d 238 ( 1958) to recover for damages sus-
tained to personal property caused by the construction of 
a public improvement on neighboring property; in addition, 
the prayer included a claim for costs in removing and relo-
cating the chattels. In dismissing the suit, the Ohio court 
declared: 
"Cases are legion to the effect that a taking 
under the power of eminent domain does not include 
the personal property lying on the premises taken 
but not affixed thereto, and that damages for injury 
to such personal property or the expense of remov-
ing it from the premises taken is not a proper ele-
ment of compensation. The reason for this rule is· 
that in an appropriation proceeding the specific 
property taken is designated and all other property 
is excluded, so that one may have compensation only 
for the property taken and for any damage to the 
residue. * * *" 
(b) Such costs and damage constitute an indi-
rect claim against the State of Utah. 
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That the claim of appellants for removal and reloca-
tion costs of personal property is disassociated with the 
evaluation proceeding in eminent domain cannot be con-
troverted. Necessarily, the conduct of the trial is directed 
toward the landed interests of the owner solely. Appellants' 
claim should be accorded similar treatment as any other 
complaint asserted against the State of Utah, the proper 
forum therefor being the State Board of Examiners. Arti-
cle VII, Section 13, Utah Constitution; Wood v. Budge, 13 
U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d 516 (1962). 
The proffer made by the property owner for reim-
bursement was an attempt to do by indirect means what 
this court, in a host of decisions, has said cannot be done 
directly. State of Utah v. Sine, 13 U. 2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585 
(1962); Fairclough v. State Road Commission, 10 U. 2d 
417, 354 P. 2d 105 (1960). District Judge Faux recognized 
that governmental immunity was a defense to the claim 
when he stated at the trial: 
"* * * With respect to defendants' conten-
tion that compensation should be allowed for the 
expense of removing personal property from the 
parcel of ground sought to be condemned, the court 
takes the view that in so doing defendants are seek-
ing damages other than that allowed by the con-
demnation statute and to allow it would in effect be 
permitting defendants to sue the state without the 
state's consent. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
Accordingly, the appeal of appellants should be denied. 
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POINT II. 
APPELLANTS FAILED TO TAKE EXCEP-
TION TO INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT 
NOS. 15 AND 16. 
(a) The landowners are, therefore, barred from 
raising objections to those instructions at the ap-
pellate level. 
Appellants, at page 12 of their brief, predicate their 
appeal upon objection to Instructions 13 through 16, in-
clusive, given by the Court to the jury. At the trial, ex-
ceptions were taken by counsel for the respective parties 
subsequent to the retirement of the jury. Objections were 
registered by counsel for the landowners only to Instruc-
tions 13 and 14, the same appearing at pages 395 and 396 
of the transcript, as follows: 
"Mr. Barker: Your Honor, my exception is on-
ly with respect to my opinion that Instructions 13 
and 14 tend to convey to the jury the negative point 
of view, only as to the propositions that the prop-
erty owners have no interest in the continued flow 
of traffic or any particular flow of traffic by the 
property whereas my instruction indicated that the 
landowner does have a 1·ig ht to reasonable access 
to the traffic on roads abutting his property and 
that the reasonableness shall be determined with 
reference to the requirements of the highway to be 
constructed and the uses to which defendants' prop-
erty may be employed. My position is that it is too 
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negative with regard to this point and fails to in-
clude the positive aspect that the landowner does 
have a right of ingress and egress in a reasonable 
manner as to all parts of his property. 
"That is all I have, Your Honor. * * *" 
The failure of appellants to make known their objections 
to Instructions 15 and 16 at the trial level is fatal to their 
effort to now raise them as an issue on appeal, for the Rules 
of this Court require that an exception be taken before 
the trial judge. Rule 51, U. R. C. P., dealing with instruc-
tions to juries, provides in part : 
•'* * * No party may asign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless 
he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the mat-
ter to which he objects and the grounds for his 
objection. * * *" 
The decisions are practically without number in this 
state in their pronouncement that unless an exception is 
taken to an instruction at the trial, an appeal may not be 
thereafter founded on that point. State v. Anderson, 75 
Utah 496, 286 Pac. 645; State v. Zimmerman, 78 Utah 126, 
1 P. 2d 962; State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 
(1957). The policy underlying Rule 51 and the decisional 
trend is that the trial judge should be informed of his error 
so that he might take steps to cure the mistake prior to the 
return of the verdict. Marks v. Tompkins, 7 Utah 421, 27 
Pac. 6. 
Although Rule 51 provides that the appellate court 
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may waive the mandatory obligation resting on each party 
in the interests of justice, McCall v. Kendrick, 2 U. 2d 364, 
274 P. 2d 962 (1954), the facts in the case at bar do not 
warrant such consideration. 
POINT III. 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT, NOS. 13 
AND 14, PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE IS-
SUES OF ACCESS-CONTROL TO THE JURY. 
(a) A prope~rty owner, whose tract abuts upon 
a public highway facility, has only the right of 
reasonable ingress and egress under the ctrcum-
stances. 
From the Statement of Facts, it is apparent that in 
conjunction with the widening of the public highway on 
21st South Street, the public agency, acting within the 
province of the police power, established various traffic 
control and regulatory devices to facilitate the movement 
of traffic. For example, concrete median-strips \\'"ere con-
structed separating east-west movement, left-hand stall 
lanes were built (see attached exhibit), and ingress and 
egress to and from contiguous tracts were defined at spe-
cific points. As a necessary corollary, the stream of traffic 
on 21st South Street, as such affected the property of ap-
pellants, was re-routed and limited. 
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Instruction No. 13 of the lower Court cautioned the 
triers of fact in their assessment of damages due to diver-
sion or denial of traffic : 
"You are instructed that a landowner whose 
property fronts upon a public highway facility has 
no right to the flow of traffic along his frontage nor 
to the continued flow of traffic which might have 
been formerly enjoyed. 
''Consequently, in your deliberations, you shall 
not assess any compensation to the defendants by 
reason of the diversion or denial of any traffic 
flowing in front of the defendants' property along 
2100 South Street prior to the construction of the 
new highway improvement." 
To begin with, it is a cardinal rule of law in this 
country that a property owner has no right to the flow of 
traffic or traffic movement and that such may be diverted, 
altered or taken away without payment of any compensa-
tion therefor. Winn v. United States, 272 F. 2d 282 (9th 
Cir. 1959); State of Oregon v. Ralston, 359 P. 2d 529 (Ore. 
1961). The Utah Supreme Court first spoke on the issue 
in State Road Commission v. Rozzelle, et ux., 101 Utah 464, 
120 P. 2d 276 (1941). It was therein said that the con-
demnee is not entitled to recover for loss of traffic by his 
property. The principle was succinctly stated in the recent 
case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 
12 U. 2d 64, 362 P. 2d 580 (1961), wherein a unanimous 
court, writing through Callister, J., said: 
"* * * Appellant's argument assumes that 
a landowner has a property right in the flow of 
traffic on a highway adjacent to his property. This 
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is not so. The owner of land abutting on a street 
or highway has no property or other vested right 
in the Jlow of traffic on that street or highway and 
is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain 
proceedings. * * *" 
To the same effect is State of California v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 
2d 217, 352 P. 2d 519 (1960). 
Secondly, the imposition of median strips to serve as 
traffic-separators and having the corresponding effect of 
eliminating left turns and promoting one-way vehicular 
movement is a prerogative of the police power of the sov-
ereign and as an attribute of that authority, any damages 
flowing from such regulation are non-compensable. Spring-
ville Banking Company v. Burton, et al., 10 U. 2d 100, 349 
P. 2d 157 (1960); Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 
713, 123 P. 2d 505 (1942); Walker v. State of Washington, 
48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P. 2d 328 ( 1956) . The policy on 
which this rule is fastened is enunciated in Springville 
Banking Cornpany v. Burton, supra. 
Instruction No. 13 is not only a precise account of an 
abstract rule, but it was also seasoned with existing cir-
cumstances in the case. 
In capsulary form, Instruction No. 14 advises the jury 
that the easement of access, appurtenant to the property 
of the landowner, is that of reasonable ingress and egress 
under the circumstances, and to the general system of 
public highways rather than a specific high,vay (see R. 
69). From the appellants' brief, it is difficult to determine 
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the nature of their objection to Instruction No. 14; in the 
lower Court, counsel for appellants urged that a right was 
guaranteed to the landowner to traffic proceeding in a 
westerly direction on 2100 South Street (Tr. 392). Before 
this Court, it is said (App. Br., p. 12) that Instruction No. 
14, in effect, advised that "appellants had no right of access 
to 2100 South Street, the denial of which appellants could 
be compensated" and that ''their rights were in common 
with the public at large." In taking their exceptions, the 
landowners objected to Instruction No. 14 as being "too 
negative" and on the ground "that the landowner does have 
a right of ingress and egress in a reasonable manner as to 
all parts of his property (Tr. 396). To crystalize these 
arguments as they relate to the power of the State of Utah 
to regulate access from a highway to abutting properties, 
some analysis of the access right, itself, is apropos. 
One of the incorporeal hereditaments recognized as an 
attribute to real property is the right to gain ingress and 
egress thereto. Once the easement of access arises, it is 
conceded that such may not be destroyed or obliterated 
\vithout the payment of compensation. Hague v. Juab 
County Mill and Elevator Company, 37 Utah 290, 107 Pac. 
249 (1910). It is quite another matter, however, to say 
that a landowner, whose property abuts upon a public 
highway facility, maintains an unfettered and indelible 
right to full access at all points along his frontage; in this 
regard, respondent submits that society has insured the 
abutter no such right. 
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This court has committed itself to the rule that a land-
owner has only the right to adequate and reasonable ingress 
and egress to the public highway, that the right of access 
does not extend to all parts fronting on the highway facility 
and that such easement is the subject of reasonable regu-
lation by the governmental authority. In Basinger v. Stan-
dard Furniture Co., 118 Utah 121, 220 P. 2d 117 (1950), 
it was held: 
"* * * The right of access to the highway, 
however, is in the nature of a special easement, 
which exists as a right of ownership of abutting 
land, and is a substantial property right which may 
not be taken away or impaired without just com-
pensation, and is subject only to reasonable regula-
tion. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
Justice Wolfe, by his concurring opinion in State Road 
Commission v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P. 2d 276 
( 1941), affirmed the authority of the public agency to reg-
ulate access : 
"* * * Any losses resulting from unreason-
ably cutting off their own access to their property 
or unreasonably interfering with their light and 
air given by reason of their abutting on a public 
highway are compensable. * * *" 
The authority of the State Road Commission to raise and 
develop limited-access highways rests with legislative enact-
ment. Title 27, Chaper 9, Section 1, et seq., U. C. A. (1953), 
empowers the Commission to "plan, designate, establish, 
improve and maintain and provide limited-access facilities" 
and to improve existing highways for such use. The char-
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acter with which the access-design is endowed is of no sig-
nificance in passing upon the question of reasonableness, 
for the effect of conventional city curbing, double lines 
painted on the shoulder of a street and a steel fence are 
parallel. 
The courts of other jurisdictions have also recognized 
only the right to reasonable access. In Smith v. State High-
way Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P. 2d 259 (1959), the 
public authority condemned access rights of the landowner; 
although the Kansas court said that the prayer in the Com-
mission's complaint required it to take all access, the guar-
antee of full and unlimited access to the abutter was de-
nied: 
"While the entire access of an abutting prop-
erty owner on an existing highway may not be cut 
off, generally an owner is not entitled, as against 
the public, to access to his land at all points in the 
boundary between it and the highway. The use of 
the streets and highways may be regulated and re-
stricted by the public authority in the exercise of 
the police power to the extent necessary to provide 
for and promote the safety, peace, health, morals 
and general welfare of the people. It is subject to 
such reasonable and impartial regulations adopted 
pursuant to this power as are calculated to secure 
to the general public the largest practical benefit 
from the enjoyment of the easement, and to provide 
for their safety while using it." 
If the regulation is determined to result in an unreasonable 
restriction and is not in harmony with the public good, the 
payment of compensation should be then forthcoming. In 
State High1vay Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 
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N. W. 2d 755 (1957), Tract A (commercial) had 216 feet 
and Tract B (residential) had 228 feet of uninterrupted 
access and frontage; upon construction of a limited-access 
highway, A was left with two openings of 34 feet, and B 
was given one opening at 18 feet. The Iowa court said that 
the claimant's easement of access did not extend to all 
points on the highway and that the question of whether 
the access afforded was reasonable was one of fact. Under 
the circumstances in Smith, the court said that access re-
maining to Tract A was reasonable, but the impairment to 
B was unreasonable, requiring the payment of compensa-
tion. 
To determine whether the access-control in the case 
at bar was reasonable, the interests of the public, together 
with that of the landowner, must be weighed. The issue is 
one that is properly presented to the trier of fact. 
(b) The finding of the jury (that remaining 
access was reasonable under the circumstances) 
was supported by the great weight of testimony. 
An abundance of testimony was elicited at the trial 
pertaining not only to the public purpose to be accomplished 
by access-regulation, but the effect that such limitation 
might have upon the remaining properties of the land-
owner. The testimony of highway engineers and research 
analysts was uncontroverted that public safety and unin-
hibited movement of traffic would be enhanced by access 
control as designed. The effect that such limitation would 
have upon the remaining property of appellants, however, 
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was disputed by the respective parties. It was admitted by 
appellants that prior to construction of the highway im-
provement, the condemnees had constructed, themselves, 
a chain link fence (7 feet high) across their entire front-
age on 2100 South Street, with only a 16-foot opening for 
ingress and egress. It was the opinion of the evaluation 
witness for the property owners that the controlled access 
device would substantially effect the use of the remaining 
tract. On the other hand, the evaluation witnesses for the 
State, Solomon, Cook and Johns, testified uniformly that 
the highest and best use of the remaining property was 
industrial utilization, that such was the zoning regulation 
applicable to the property, and that under such use, an in-
dustrial park could be developed, predicated on access de-
sign, without any increment of loss. Upon the close of the 
evidence, the issue of reasonableness was correctly sub-
mitted by the lower Court to the jury through special in-
terrogatory. It is rudimentary in this State that a finding 
of fact, on matters at law, will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless such is determined to be clearly against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 
Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174. 
Against the finding on the special interrogatory, ap-
pellants contend in their brief that the access-regulation 
constituted a "substantial impairment", and was "unreas-
onable." Such statements are wholly argumentative; upon 
review by this court, the verdict of the fact finder is en-
titled to a presumption of validity. McCollum v. Clothier, 
121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468; Seybold v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., supra. 
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The instructions of the lower Court accurately advised 
the jury of thes rights and of the power residing with the 
public agency to divert traffic movement and to regulate 
access. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim of appellants for costs, expenses and dam-
ages incident to removal and relocation of personal prop-
erty from the condemned tract are not recoverable in emi-
nent domain; the determination of the lower Court denying 
such claim should be affirmed. 
An owner of property whose land abuts upon a public 
highway has neither the right to the flow of traffic along 
his frontage nor the protection of unlimited access at all 
points fronting upon the facility. The respondent, by the 
police po,ver, may divert and reroute traffic and control 
access to and from the abutter' tract without the payment 
of compensation, unless the latter is found to be unreason-
able. The directions to the jury, incorporating these prin-
ciples, were correctly outlined in Instructions 13 and 14 of 
the lower Court. Appellants have no standing to urge er-
ror in Instructions 15 and 16. Accordingly, the judgment 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
: q. 4E 
---
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
